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Abstract: This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods 
in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to 
join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement 
efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also 
demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. 
Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or 
by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and 










The provision of public goods constitutes a social dilemma in which individually rational choices 
are not collectively rational. Absent appropriate institutions, voluntary contributions to public 
goods will be underprovided relative to the social optimum. The analysis and design of 
institutions to coordinate voluntary provision of public goods is important for understanding how 
groups may overcome this social dilemma.  Most economic studies on institutions in public 
goods games analyze the performance of exogenous institutions; however, in many contexts 
there is no governing body that can impose a set of rules on a group of agents. Important 
examples are found in the context of international public goods. The management of many 
international resources constitute social dilemmas in which countries‘ unilateral management of 
resources result in suboptimal international management (e.g., green-house-gas emissions, 
nuclear non-proliferation). Because nations are sovereign, any institutional arrangement created 
to increase provision of an international public good has to be developed endogenously. 
  In this paper we explore, theoretically and experimentally, a form of endogenous 
institution formation in which agents voluntarily form coalitions to provide a public good. Prior 
to making the decision whether to join the coalition all players vote on the minimum number of 
members required for a coalition to form. A coalition forms if enough players voluntarily join so 
that the minimum membership requirement is met or surpassed, and only then are members 
required to make contributions to the public good. Many international treaties and almost all 
international environmental treaties contain minimum participation requirements like the one 
explored in this paper. For example, the Kyoto Protocol required ratification by at least 55 
parties accounting for at least 55 percent of the total 1990 greenhouse gas emissions. The 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer entered into force when at least 
11 countries ratified and members needed to represent at least two-thirds of the total 1986 
consumption of ozone-depleting substances. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons required ratification by the then five nuclear nations plus 40 additional nations for 
entry into force. Some treaties require all affected parties to join; for example, the Convention 3 
 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic required ratification by 
all 13 parties.
1  
  This study adds to a growing literature on endogenous institution formation to confront 
social dilemmas (see, for examples, Walker et al. 2000; Gurerk et al. 2006; Tyran and Feld 2006; 
Kroll et al. 2007; Burger and Kolstad 2009; Kosfeld et al. 2009; Sutter et al. 2010). Our work is 
perhaps closest to that of Kosfeld et al. (2009). They also analyze the formation of a voluntary 
coalition designed to increase contributions to a public good. In their game players first decide 
whether to join a coalition, and then later the members vote on whether to contribute to the 
public good.  Hence, in their analysis members of a coalition decide what the coalition should 
accomplish after they make their participation decision. In contrast, the players in our study 
understand ex ante what they are required to do in a coalition. This is closer to the actual process 
of coalition formation to provide international public goods, where countries typically decide the 
commitments of coalition members and what triggers a coalition to form before they decide 
whether to join.  
  We examine this institution both theoretically and with laboratory experiments. Our 
theoretical model is a two-stage public goods game in which individuals with identical financial 
payoffs decide whether to contribute a single unit of the public good.  In the first stage of the 
game all members of a group vote on the adoption of a minimum membership requirement that 
must be met if a coalition is to form. In the second stage each individual decides whether they 
will join the coalition. If enough individuals join to meet the membership requirement, a 
coalition forms, the members of the coalition each provide their unit of the public good, while 
nonmembers keep theirs. A unique feature of the theoretical model and our experiments is that 
efficient provision of the public good may require that all individuals contribute (i.e., the grand 
coalition is efficient), or efficiency may require that only a subset of individuals contribute.  
  To our knowledge, Carraro et al. (2009) provide the only theoretical account of 
endogenous membership requirements for coalitions that form to provide public goods (they 
focus on the provision of international environmental quality, but their model can be applied 
more generally). They show that this feature increases participation in these coalitions. Our 
initial theoretical model is a special case of the Carraro et al. model. We demonstrate that, if all 
                                                 
1  See  Barrett  (2003)  for  a  more  thorough  examination  of  participation  requirements  in 
international environmental agreements. 4 
 
players only care about maximizing their expected financial payoffs, they will vote to implement 
an efficient coalition size as the membership requirement and this coalition will form. This is 
true regardless of whether the efficient coalition is the grand coalition or some smaller coalition.  
  We then extend the coalition formation model to allow for the possibility that some 
individuals are inequality averse. Individual preferences for equity or fairness have been well 
documented in the economics literature (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gachter 2000a; Fehr 
and Gachter 2000b; Charness and Rabin 2002; Camerer 2003; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; 
Fehr et al. 2006).  We suspect that these preferences may be particularly important for situations 
in which efficiency requires only partial coalition participation, because in these cases it is 
optimal that some individuals free ride, and hence, earn higher payoffs than coalition members. 
We demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can move groups to inefficient 
outcomes, particularly if an efficient coalition is smaller than the grand coalition. Inequality-
averse individuals can cause larger-than-efficient coalitions to form, and they may incur financial 
losses to block efficient coalitions from forming.   
  We conducted laboratory experiments to test the theory. In treatments for which the 
efficient coalition was the grand coalition, coalitions formed most of the time and most of these 
were efficient. However, in treatments for which the efficient coalition required only half the 
members of a group, coalitions formed in just over half the trials, but only half of these were 
efficient. In fact, the grand coalition, despite being inefficient, formed at close to the same rate 
(18%) as the efficient coalition (23%). Moreover, the efficient coalition formed in only about 
half the trials in which it was adopted as the membership requirement. These results are not 
consistent with a theoretical model of players who are only concerned with material payoffs, but 
they are consistent with a model that includes inequality-averse players. Our experiments also 
demonstrate the value of the endogenous implementation of a minimum membership 
requirement in promoting coalition formation and public good provision, at least when the 
efficient coalition is the grand coalition. In these cases we observe significant efficiency gains 
compared to previous studies that use similar incentives but without endogenous minimum 






In this section we lay out the theoretical underpinnings of our experiments. We first present a 
model of identical, risk-neutral players who vote on the number of members a coalition must 
contain for it to form, and then decide whether to join such a coalition. Players in this model seek 
to maximize their expected financial payoffs. Like Kosfeld et al. (2009), we say that such players 
have standard preferences. We then extend the model to examine the consequences of the 
presence of some players with an aversion to inequality in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).   
 
2.1 A model of coalition formation with standard preferences 
Consider a game in which n-players decide whether to contribute a single unit to a public good. 
Let the number of individuals who contribute to the public good (and the total supply of the 
public good) be s.   Let b > 0 denote the shared benefit players receive from contributions to the 
public good up to sn   and let c > 0 denote the individual cost of contributing.  The basic 
financial payoff function of a player that contributed to the public good is  
  , i A bs c      for ss  ,                [1] 
where A is a positive constant.  Assume that c > b so that no player would contribute to the 
public good in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.  However, suppose that collective welfare is 
maximized when s  individuals contribute their units to the public good. We allow for the 
possibility that it is efficient that the public good be provided by a coalition that is smaller than 
the grand coalition.  We assume a simple case of this in which individual contributions yield a 
return of b up to an aggregate level and additional contributions yield a return of zero. Examples 
of this include any project for which contributions in excess of what is required to provide the 
good do not yield public benefits. Our specification also covers cases in which collective welfare 
is maximized when everyone contributes their unit to the public good; that is, when sn  . Note 
that if s  is efficient then  () n A bs cs nA    , which requires nb c  . 
  Given the motivation for collective action to provide the public good, suppose that the 
players are able to form a cooperative coalition in a two-stage game. In the first stage (the voting 
stage), all players vote on the minimum number of members required for a coalition to form. We 
call the outcome of this vote the minimum membership requirement. In our experiments we 
implement a modal-response voting rule, so that the number that receives the most votes 
becomes the membership requirement, but other rules are possible.  In stage two of the coalition 6 
 
formation game (the coalition stage), the players decide independently whether or not to join the 
coalition. If enough players join so that the membership requirement is met, the coalition forms 
and its members provide their units of the public good. Throughout we call such a coalition an 
effective coalition.  Those that do not join an effective coalition do not provide their units of the 
public good (because c > b), but still benefit from its provision.  If the minimum membership 
requirement is not met, an effective coalition does not form, and no player contributes to the 
public good.   
  The equilibrium of this game is found by backward induction, so we start by describing 
the coalition stage.  At this point in the game a minimum membership requirement has been 
chosen. Denote the membership requirement as . p s  Using [1], those who decide to join a 
coalition with s members earn: 
 
for   if  ;






A bs c s s s s
s A bs c s s s s
A s s

    
      
               [2] 
Throughout the superscript m indicates the player is a member of a coalition. Nonmembers, 
identified by the superscript nm, earn: 
 
for   if  ;






A bs s s s s
s A bs s s s s
A s s

   
     
               [3] 
From [2] and [3] it is clear that when an effective coalition forms, nonmembers earn strictly 
higher profits than members because they enjoy the benefits of public good contributions without 
incurring the cost of contributing. However, if the minimum membership requirement is not met, 
both members and nonmembers earn their noncooperative payoffs. 
  Players will join an effective coalition only if it is profitable for them to do so in the sense 
that they earn at least as much in the coalition as they would if no coalition formed. Thus, a 
coalition is profitable for its members if and only if  ( | )
m
p s s s A bs c A       . Assume 
throughout that a coalition with s  members is profitable for individuals with standard 
preferences so that  ( | )
m
p s s s A   , or rather,  0 bs c . Note from [2] that  ( | )
m
p s s s    is 
increasing in s up to s , and then is constant. For analytic convenience, we assume that s is a 7 
 
continuous variable throughout. Therefore, the smallest possible profitable coalition is the 
solution to  ( | )
m
p s s s A sb c A       , yielding  
  min /. s c b                      [4] 
Since a coalition with s  members is profitable,  min ss  .  For an effective coalition to form in 
the second stage of the game both the membership requirement and the profitability requirement 
must be satisfied; that is, a coalition can form if  min p ss  . However, it is not guaranteed that a 
coalition forms even when min p ss  . Other equilibria are possible, including one in which an 
effective coalition does not form. In addition, when min p s s n  , coalitions of size
  , 1,..., pp s s s n can exist in equilibrium. However, if we require that equilibrium coalitions 
satisfy a strictness refinement then we have a clear prediction from the coalition stage. A Nash 
equilibrium is considered strict if every player is strictly worse off by deviating from equilibrium 
play. Under the strictness refinement, if  min p ss   then a coalition of size sp will form in the 
second stage of the game.
2 
  Now let us examine the determination of sp in the voting (first) stage of the game. In this 
stage players simultaneously submit votes for the minimum membership requirement to be 
implemented in the coalition formation stage. It is straightforward to show that a player with 
standard preferences would never vote to implement a membership requirement for a coalition 
that is unprofitable, so we do not have to consider membership requirements below  min s .  For 
larger coalitions, we assume that players vote to implement membership requirements that yield 
their highest expected payoff, where the uncertainty is about whether they will eventually join an 
effective coalition.  Since the players are identical it is reasonable to assume that each of them 
believes that they have the same chance of joining an effective coalition as any other member. 
Therefore, a player‘s evaluation of the probability of being part of an effective coalition is  / sn , 
and his or her subjective expected payoff is: 
                                                 
2 Kosfeld et al. (2009) also appeal to the strictness refinement to arrive at a unique equilibrium 
prediction  in  the stage  game. The equilibrium in  their game is  the minimum  size profitable 
coalition (under standard preferences). In contrast, the equilibrium in our game is the minimum 
membership  requirement  which  will  be  a  weakly  larger  than  the  minimum  size  profitable 
coalition. 8 
 
      ( ) ( ) / ( ) ( )/
m nm v s s s n s n s n    
.            [5] 
Substitute [2] and [3] for  p ss  into [5] and differentiate to obtain  
 
( )/ 0, for  ;
()
/ 0, for  ,
nb c n s s
vs
c n s s
   
                     [6] 
which indicates that the expected payoff of every player is increasing in the size of a cooperative 
coalition between  min s  and s . This, in turn, implies that under the modal response voting rule, as 
well as more restrictive voting rules (e.g., unanimity, super majority, or majority), all players will 
vote to implement the efficient coalition membership requirement in the first stage of the game. 
In the second stage, the efficient coalition size will form. Under these circumstances, therefore, 
players are expected to form the efficient cooperative coalition endogenously, and this is 
independent of whether efficiency requires full participation (i.e., the grand coalition) or only 
partial participation. 
 
2.2 A model of coalition formation with inequality-averse players   
In social dilemma games such as this one, it is possible that players have preferences beyond 
financial self-interest. In coalition formation games, inequality aversion, triggered by the 
difference between the payoffs of coalition members and free-riding nonmembers, may affect 
players‘ voting and participation decisions. To investigate this possibility, we amend our 
coalition formation model to allow individuals to be inequality averse as in Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999).
3 
  To incorporate inequality aversion, first suppose that sn   and  0 p s  . Given the 
financial payoffs [2] and [3] with these restrictions, define the utility of a member of an effective 
coalition with s members as 
    ( ) ( ) max ( ),0 max ( ) ,0
11
m m m m ii
i i j i i j
j i j i
u s s s s
nn

    

    
  ,   [7] 
                                                 
3 We adapt the model of inequality aversion  developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) because it 
translates nicely into a model of coalition formation. However, other models of inequality 
aversion and social preferences exist (e.g., Rabin 1993; Bolton and Ockenf els 2000; Charness 
and Rabin 2002; Cox et al. 2007).   9 
 
where 0 i    captures the player‘s loss from disadvantageous inequality and  0 i    captures her 
loss from advantageous inequality. Since   ( ) ( )
nm m
ji s s c    and  ( ) ( ) 0
mm
ji ss    from [2] 







u s A bs c
n
 
   

.               [8] 
Similarly, the utility of a nonmember of an effective coalition with s members is: 
    ( ) ( ) max ( ),0 max ( ) ,0
11
nm nm nm nm ii
i i j i i j
j i j i
u s s s s
nn

    

    
  ,   [9] 
which can be written as  










.                [10] 
The free-riding incentive is preserved in this model if ( 1)( 1) ii n     ; that is, as long as the 
aversion to advantageous inequality is not too strong relative to the aversion to disadvantageous 
inequality.
4  
  Incorporating the efficient coalition size sn   yields: 
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for   if  ;
1 ()
()









A bs c s s s s
n us
n s c




                  
  
         [11] 
for   if  ;
1 ()









A bs s s s s
n us
sc




         
    
  
          [12] 
All players earn A for coalition sizes that do not meet a minimum membership requirement. 
  Using [11], an individual‘s minimum profitable coalition size can be characterized as:  
                                                 
4 The freeriding incentive is preserved if      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) 1 0
m nm
i i i i i u s u s c s n n n             for 
each possible s.  Note that  ( ) ( )
m nm
ii u s s    is increasing in s. Therefore, a player prefers to 
freeride on any effective coalition if  ( ) ( )
m nm
ii u s s    is negative when  1 sn 
.  Calculate 
( 1) ( 1)
m nm
ii u n u n   













  where 













          [13] 




i n s c
A bs c A
n
 
   

.                [14] 
Since  ()
m
i us in [11] is increasing in s, if  ˆi ss   then  ˆi s  is i‘s minimum profitable coalition size. 




i n s c
A bs c A
n
 
   

.                [15]  
Now plug  ˆi s  into [14] and  i s  into [15], set the resulting equations equal to each other and collect 
terms to obtain  ˆˆ ( ) ( )/( 1) i i i i b s s c s s n      which implies that  ˆ ii ss   if  ˆi ss  .  
  The specification of  i s  may be the most important result of this model because it reveals 
why inequality aversion can produce inefficient outcomes. Disadvantageous inequality aversion 
(i.e.,  0 i   ) implies that  min i ss  .
5 Thus, there are coalitions that are profitable in terms of 
financial payoffs, but an inequality-averse individual would not find profitable in terms of utility. 
This limits the range of coalitions that an individual finds acceptable: a larger-than-efficient 
coalition might be required to be profitable.  We will see shortly how this can lead to the 
formation of inefficiently large coalitions.  Moreover, such individuals might refuse to join an 
efficient coalition when it is smaller than the grand coalition, which can prevent efficient 
coalitions from forming. To understand how, define a critical player as one whose choice to not 
join a coalition prevents the coalition from forming. A critical individual blocks a coalition if he 
or she decides to not join. (This does not imply that a coalition forms if a critical player chooses 
to join—there are likely to be multiple critical players).  For example, suppose as in our 
experiments that we have six players who vote to implement a membership requirement of three 
and assume that a three-player coalition is efficient. Suppose further that the first three players to 
make their second-stage choice decide to not to join the coalition. Then, each of the remaining 
three players is critical. Now, suppose that one of the remaining critical players has an aversion 
to payoff inequality.  Although she is critical for the coalition to form, she may choose to opt out 
                                                 
5 This follows from  ˆ ii ss  ,  ˆi s is increasing in  i  , and  min ˆi ss  for  0 i   . 11 
 
if she finds a three-player coalition unprofitable because of her aversion to disadvantageous 
inequality. In this way, an inequality-averse player can prevent an efficient coalition from 
forming.  
  Now let us turn to the players‘ voting preferences. Since they are heterogeneous because 
of differences in their aversion to inequality, it seems too restrictive to assume that each of them 
would believe that they have the same chance of being part of an effective coalition as any other 
player.  Let  () i ps be i‘s subjective probability that it will join a coalition with s members in the 
coalition stage. This probability is zero for coalition sizes that i finds unprofitable and is equal to 
one for the grand coalition. That is,  ( ) 0 i ps  for  i ss   and  ( ) 1 i pn .  Suppose further that 
  ( ) 0 i ps    in the range of ( , ) i sn.  A player‘s subjective expected payoff in this range is  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )
m nm
i i i i i v s p s u s p s u s     .            [16] 
Remove the minimum membership requirement from [11] and [12], substitute the result into 
[16], differentiate with respect to s in the range of ( , ) i sn, and simplify terms to obtain the 
following. An individual‘s marginal expected utility when  i ss   is:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ,for  [ , ),
1 1 1 1
()
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ,for  .
1 1 1 1
i i i i i i
ii
i
i i i i i i
i
n s c sc p s c c
p s c b s s s
n n n n
vs
n s c sc p s c c
p s c s s
n n n n
    
    
                      
                   
[17]  
The individual‘s marginal expected utility when  i ss   is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
i i i i i i
ii
n s c sc p s c c
v s p s c
n n n n
                   
.        [18]  
The first term in [17] and [18] is negative because
()




n s c sc
c u s u s
nn
 
    

is 
negative for sn  given that free-riding nonmembers are better off than coalition members. The 
second term in the sum is positive.  /( 1) i b c n    is positive as along as freeriders are better off 
with larger coalitions: above s  this term reduces to  /( 1) 0. icn      Thus, in all cases the sign 
of  () i vs   is indeterminate at this level of generality. This indeterminacy is due to inequality 
aversion and our inability to pin down an individual‘s subjective probability that she will join a 
coalition when others in her group have heterogeneous preferences.   12 
 
  We do know, however, that an individual with standard preferences in a population that 
includes inequality-averse individuals will likely vote to implement the efficient coalition as the 
minimum membership requirement and would never vote for a larger membership requirement. 
To see this, we can use [13] to show that the minimum profitable coalition for an individual with 
standard preferences is  min . i s s s   This implies that [17] is the relevant marginal expected 
payoff function with  0 ii   . Thus,  ( ) ( ) ii v s b p s c    for  min [ , ) s s s  , and  ( ) ( ) ii v s p s c    
for ss  . If  () i ps   is not too large (e.g., not too much larger than 1/n), then 
( ) ( ) 0 ii v s b p s c     , indicating that the individual would vote to implement s  as the 
membership requirement. However,  ( ) 0 i vs    for larger coalitions. Thus, an individual with 
standard preferences would never vote for an inefficiently large coalition as the group‘s 
membership requirement.  
  In contrast, inequality-averse individuals might vote to implement membership 
requirements that exceed the efficient coalition size. Depending on the voting rule and the 
distribution of preferences in a group, inequality aversion can lead to the implementation of 
inefficiently large coalitions. Suppose, for example, that all individuals are inequality averse and 
that their expected payoffs are higher for coalitions above s . We would expect this group to 
implement a minimum participation rule above s  and that such a coalition will form in the 
second stage of the game. 
   It is also possible that inequality aversion can prevent coalitions from forming, because it 
creates tension in the desired size of coalitions between those with standard preferences who 
prefer efficient coalitions and those who are inequality averse who prefer larger coalitions. There 
is a special case of this result that turns out to be important in our experiments. We find a small 
but significant number of situations in which a player voted to implement the efficient coalition 
size as the membership requirement in the first stage, this requirement was implemented, but the 
individual then blocked the coalition in the coalition formation stage. These seemingly 
contradictory actions are actually consistent with our model. Certainly an individual with 
standard preferences would never vote to implement the efficient coalition as the membership 
requirement and then block it, because efficient coalitions are profitable for individuals with 
standard preferences. However, these actions might be rational for an inequality-averse 
individual. Consider such an individual with a minimum profitable coalition above s . This 13 
 
individual will never join a coalition with s  members, but she might vote to implement s  as the 
membership requirement.  To see why, suppose that her assessment of the likelihood of joining a 
profitable coalition, along with her preferences for equity and the fundamental parameters of the 
game result in [18] being negative.  This person would not vote for a membership requirement 
that exceeds her minimum profitable coalition size. She will instead vote for a smaller 
membership requirement, but will refuse to join a coalition of this size because it is not profitable 
for her. Which coalition will she vote for? In this case note that her expected payoff [16] reduces 
to  ( ) ( )
nm
ii v s u s  . From [12], this is increasing in s up to s  and then is decreasing for ss  .  
Therefore, the individual will vote to implement s  as the membership requirement, but of 
course, she would block this coalition if she ever became critical for its formation. This 
occurrence turns out to be significant in our experiments.  
  In summary, our coalition formation model with individual with standard preferences 
predicts that players will implement efficient coalitions, regardless of whether efficiency requires 
full or partial participation. The presence of inequality-averse individuals makes additional 
equilibria possible. In particular, inequality-averse individuals can cause inefficiently large 
coalitions to form and can cause efficient coalitions to fail.  With theory as a guide, the 




Following our theoretical models, our experiments have two stages, a voting stage and a 
coalition formation stage. The context of the experiment is fairly generic: subjects decide 
whether to join a coalition (called an agreement) with its members making a discrete choice to 
contribute to the public good (called a public account). We implement four experimental 
treatments that differ according to the returns to individual contributions to the public good. In 
two treatments, the marginal return to contributions is constant so that the efficient coalition is 
the grand coalition. In the other two treatments, the marginal return to public good contributions 
is constant up until an aggregate level and then zero so that the efficient coalition is smaller than 
the grand coalition. Each pair of treatments includes one in which players have homogenous 
payoffs and another in which payoffs are heterogeneous. We parameterized the treatments so that 
the equilibrium predictions given standard preferences were the same under both homogeneous 14 
 
and heterogeneous payoffs.   Although our theoretical treatment of the coalition formation 
problem did not include heterogeneous payoffs, we included these treatment treatments to test 
whether this feature affected coalition formation behavior.  
  We chose parameter values of n = 6, A = 10, c = 10 for all four treatments.  In one of the 
treatments in which all subjects had identical payoff functions, the marginal return to all 
individual contributions was set at b = 4.5. Since nb – c > 0 for all contributions, the efficient 
coalition in this case is six individuals ( 6 s  ).  In the other treatment with identical payoffs, b = 
4.5 for contributions up to three units and then zero after three units. The efficient coalition size 
in this case is three individuals ( 3 s  ).  In one of the treatments in which players had 
heterogeneous payoffs, three individuals had 5 h b  (high earners) while the other three had  4 l b 
(low earners ) for all contributions. The grand coalition is efficient in this treatment. In the other 
heterogeneous payoff treatment, individual marginal returns were zero after three units were 
contributed. The efficient coalition in this case contains three members of any combination of 
high and low earners.  The payoff parameters are such that all three-player coalitions in all 
treatments are profitable for individuals with standard preferences.  
  All sessions were run at the experimental economics laboratory at [insert institution here] 
using software specifically designed for this experiment. In each session, three groups of six 
subjects were in the lab. These groups of six remained constant throughout the experiment (i.e., 
partners design) which lasted 20 periods. We ran one session for each of the four treatments and 
therefore we have 72 subjects who generated 1,440 individual-level observations. These 
observations include their votes for the membership requirement in the first stage and their 
decision to join a coalition in the second stage.  
  In the first stage of the experiments, subjects voted on the minimum membership 
requirement for a coalition to form in the second stage. They were given 60 seconds to vote by 
selecting a number, in the range of one to six, from a listbox.  Subjects could change their votes 
during the voting period, but the number selected in the subject‘s listbox at the end of the 60 
seconds, was recorded as their vote. A unique feature of our voting protocol was that a subject‘s 
selection from the listbox was viewed by the other five group members.  Although only the 
subject‘s final selection was recorded as their vote, this feature allowed for a type of structured 
group communication in which subjects exchanged information about their intended votes. This 
communication feature better represents the process of determining minimum participation 15 
 
requirements for international agreements compared to simultaneous voting without the ability to 
communicate. A modal response voting rule was used. The membership requirement that 
received the most votes was implemented in the second stage of the game. Ties were settled by a 
random draw. 
  In the coalition formation stage, each subject decided whether or not to join the coalition. 
Again, players are given 60 seconds to make their decision. Once a subject made their choice 
they could not change it. During the stage, all subjects were given real-time information about 
the decisions made by the other five members in the group. Specifically, they were informed 
about the number of other subjects that had joined the coalition, the number of others that 
decided not to join, and the number of others that had not yet made a decision. Therefore, each 
player knew whether their participation decision was critical for the coalition to form.
6  If 
someone failed to make a decision within the allotted time, she was made not to join the coalition 
by default.
7  
  If enough players joined the coalition to satisfy the minimum membership requirement, 
then the coalition ‗formed‘ and those that joined contributed to the public good. Those who did 
not join did not contribute. If too few subjects joined the coalition to satisfy the membership 
requirement, then no coalition formed and no one contributed to the public good. This stage of 
the experiment is very similar to traditional threshold public goods experiments that utilize 
                                                 
6 The experiments deviate slightly from the theory in the coalition stage in that subjects make 
their participation decisions sequentially and with complete information. This deviation from 
theory,  however,  does  not  change  the  size  of  the  coalition  in  a  sub -game  perfect  Nash 
equilibrium in comparison to the simultaneous  move  game. The equilibrium coalition  is  sp 
provided  that  this  coalition  size  is  profitable  for  enough  members.  The  sequential  decision 
making feature under complete information is useful in our experiments because it limits the 
extent of coordination problems since each player knows whether they are critical for a coalition 
to form.    
7 The software was designed with a number of features to ensure that subjects had complete 
information regarding the choices made by the other group members when making their choice. 
For example, if more than one subject made a decision within the same seco nd, only the first 
decision was recorded. In those situations the subjects whose decision did not register received a 
message informing them that their action was not recorded and instructed them that the group‘s 
information had changed. Those subjects could then reevaluate their position and were given the 
opportunity to make another decision. In addition, if a group member made a decision within the 
last  five  seconds  of  the  round  when  some  subjects  remained  undecided,  an  additional  five 
seconds were added to the time remaining. This feature provided undecided subjects enough time 
to assimilate changes before making their decision.     16 
 
money-back guarantees (Dawes et al. 1986; Erev and Rapoport 1990; Bagnoli and McKee 1991; 
Cadsby and Maynes 1999). 
  Our theoretical development suggests two sets of predictions, one for situations in which 
all players in a group have standard preferences and another when some individuals in a group 
are inequality-averse.  If all individuals have standard preferences, then the theory suggests that 
subjects will vote to make the efficient size coalition the minimum membership requirement in 
the first stage, and this coalition will form in the second. This is true whether the efficient 
coalition is the grand coalition or the smaller coalition of size three.  Given our chosen 
parameters, this prediction holds under homogeneous and heterogeneous payoffs.  
  However, if some subjects are inequality averse, many outcomes are possible, 
particularly when the efficient coalition is smaller than the grand coalition; that is, when 
inequality itself is efficient. In the experiments in which the grand coalition is efficient, we 
expect that this coalition will form even if some subjects are inequality averse, since there is no 
inequality when the grand coalition forms.  If inequality aversion is important, we expect its 
effects to show up in the experiments for which 3-player coalitions are efficient. In these cases, 
we‘ve shown that inefficiently large coalitions may form and that efficient coalitions may fail to 
form. Thus, under the treatments in which a 3-person coalition is efficient, we may observe a 
significant number of larger coalitions forming. Moreover, if the 3-person membership 




Our experimental data suggest the following broad conclusions. In the treatments for which the 
grand coalition was efficient (the  6 s   treatments), individuals voted overwhelmingly to 
implement the 6-player membership requirement. The grand coalition formed in a significant 
majority of trials, leading to high efficiency as measured by the ratio of group earnings to 
maximum group earnings. Performance was significantly worse in the treatments for which a 3-
player coalition was efficient (the  3 s   treatments).  Coalitions formed in only about half of the 
trials and only half of these were efficient. Consequently, average efficiency was significantly 
lower in these treatments than in the  6 s   treatments. These results, and the individual voting 
decisions and decisions to join coalitions that we now look at in detail, are not consistent with a 17 
 
theory of coalition formation that includes only individuals with standard preferences. They are, 
however, consistent with a theory that allows for the presence of inequality-averse players.  
  We first examine the data on voting for the membership requirement in the first stage of 
the experiments. Table 1 provides votes and referenda outcomes by membership requirement 
and treatment. The first row in each cell contains the number of votes and percentage of total 
votes (out of 360 for each treatment) for that minimum membership requirement. The second 
row in each cell contains the number of times and percentage of trails in the treatment (out of 60) 
that membership requirement was implemented. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests of the null 
hypothesis that the samples of votes under homogenous and heterogeneous payoff treatments are 
drawn from the same distribution are rejected but only at the 10 percent level of significance (p = 
0.097 for both tests under s = 3 and s = 6). K-S tests of the null hypotheses that the samples of 
adopted membership requirements under homogenous and heterogeneous payoff treatments are 
drawn from the same distribution cannot be rejected (p = 0.809 under s = 3; 0.925 under s = 6). 
Since the patterns of votes and membership requirements for the homogeneous and 
heterogeneous treatments are so similar, we discuss only the combined results for the s = 3 and 





















Table 1: Individual votes and referenda outcomes by minimum membership requirement 
and treatment 18 
 
  Minimum membership requirement 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
6 s               
     Homogeneous  6 (1.7%)  7 (1.9%)  17 (4.7%)  26 (7.2%)  72 (20.0%)  232 (64.4%) 
       1 (1.7%)  1 (1.7%)  2 (3.3%)  4 (6.7%)  6 (10.0%)  46 (76.7%) 
             
     Heterogeneous  19 (5.3%)  18 (5.0%)  21 (5.8%)  31 (8.6%)  63 (17.5%)  208 (57.8%) 
       1 (1.7%)  3 (5.0%)  4 (6.7%)  4 (6.7%)  8 (13.3%)  40 (66.7%) 
             
     Combined  25 (3.5%)  25 (3.5%)  38 (5.3%)  57 (7.9%)  135 (18.8%)  440 (61.1%) 
       2 (1.7%)  4 (3.3%)  6 (5.0%)  8 (6.7%)  14 (11.7%)  86 (71.7%) 
             
3 s               
     Homogeneous  25 (6.9%)  39 (10.8%)  160 (44.4%)  22 (6.1%)  33 (9.2%)  81 (22.5%) 
  2 (3.3%)  6 (10.0%)  33 (55.0%)  4 (6.7%)  3 (5.0%)  12 (20.0%) 
             
     Heterogeneous  16 (4.4%)  40 (11.1%)  150 (41.7%)  21 (5.8%)  19 (5.3%)  114 (31.7%) 
       2 (3.3%)  7 (11.7%)  26 (43.3%)  3 (5.0%)  3 (5.0%)  19 (31.7%) 
             
     Combined  41 (5.7%)  79 (11.0%)  310 (43.1%)  43 (6.0%)  52 (7.2%)  195 (27.1%) 
       4 (3.3%)  13 (10.9%)  59 (49.2%)  7 (5.8%)  6 (5.0%)  31 (25.8%) 
Top of each cell: Number of votes for each minimum membership requirement (percent of total votes by treatment). 
Note there are 360 individual votes per treatment. Bottom of each cell: Number of times each minimum 
membership requirement was implemented (percent of total trials by treatment). Note there are 60 group-level 
observations per treatment. 
 
  Under the s = 6 treatments, the 6-player membership requirement received 61.1 percent 
(440 of 720) of total votes, which is considerably more than the 18.8 percent received by the 
second most preferred option of a 5-player membership requirement.  The remaining four 
options received even fewer votes. This voting behavior resulted in the selection of the efficient 
grand coalition in 71.7 percent (86 of 120) of referenda. Voting behavior is generally consistent 
with our predictions for the s = 6 treatments with and without the presence of inequality-averse 
players. 
  Voting under the  3 s  treatments was more complicated. Even though the 3-player 
membership requirement received the greatest number of votes (43.1%), this is significantly less 
than the percentage of votes to implement the efficient coalition as the membership requirement 
under  6 s  treatments (61.1%, p = 0.000).
8  Moreover, the subjects under the  3 s  treatments 
                                                 
8 We report unconditional summary statistics in our tables. However, we recognize that our 
observations are not entirely independent as the same subject makes repeated decisions as part of 19 
 
showed a considerable tendency to vote to implement higher membership requirements, in 
particular the 6-player membership requirement (27.1% of the votes). Membership requirements 
mirror the votes, with the 3-player requirement being implemented in 49.2 percent of the trials 
and the 6-player requirement implemented in 25.8 percent of the trials.  Therefore groups under 
the  3 s  treatments implemented the efficient coalition size as the membership requirement 
considerably more often than the 6-player requirement. However, we will see shortly that this 
difference did not result in the efficient coalition forming significantly more often than the 6-
player coalition.  
  Our theoretical model with standard preferences predicts that groups will always 
implement the efficient coalition size as the minimum membership requirement. This hypothesis 
is clearly violated in our  3 s  treatments. However, implementing larger membership 
requirements is consistent with the presence of inequality-averse subjects. While the 3-player 
coalition is efficient, this coalition size requires a subset of players to not join the coalition and 
free ride off contributions of the members. By requiring that everyone join a coalition for it to 
form, groups can eliminate the freeriding. The support for 3-player and 6-player membership 
requirements suggests a fundamental tension between efficiency and eliminating inequality in 
our experiments.  
   Table 2 contains results concerning coalition formation by minimum membership 
requirement and treatment. For each membership requirement/treatment combination we provide 
the number of times a coalition formed under the membership requirement, this number as a 
percentage of total trials, and coalition formations as a percentage of times the membership 
requirement was adopted. In the final column in Table 2 we present the number and percentage 
of trials a coalition of any size formed (i.e., all effective coalitions). A z-test comparing the 
proportion of coalition formation between homogeneous and heterogeneous treatments suggests 
the two are equivalent (p = 0.583 under s = 3; p = 0.307 under s = 6) and therefore we examine 
the combined data. 
    
                                                                                                                                                             
a stable group. To address this issue our hypotheses tests use linear regression techniques to 
control for period, subject (for individual-level data) and group (for group-level data) fixed 





Table 2: Coalition formation by minimum membership requirement and treatment 
  Minimum membership requirement 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
6 s                 
Homogeneous  1  0  2  1  4  45  53 
  1.7%  0.0%  3.3%  1.7%  6.7%  75.0%  88.3% 
  100.0%  0.0%  100.0%  25.0%  66.7%  97.8%   
               
Heterogeneous  1  0  2  2  7  37  49 
  1.7%  0.0%  3.3%  3.3%  11.7%  61.7%  81.7% 
  100.0%  0.0%  50.0%  50.0%  87.5%  92.5%   
 
Combined  2  0  4  3  11  82  102 
  1.7%  0.0%  3.3%  2.5%  9.2%  68.3%  85.0% 
  100.0%  0.0%  66.7%  37.5%  78.6%  95.4%   
3 s                 
Homogeneous  1  1  15  1  0  12  60 
  1.7%  1.7%  25.0%  1.7%  0.0%  20.0%  50.0% 
  50.0%  16.7%  45.5%  25.0%  0.0%  100.0%   
 
Heterogeneous  0  3  13  0  1  10  27 
  0.0%  5.0%  21.7%  0.0%  1.7%  16.7%  45.5% 
  0.0%  42.9%  50.0%  0.0%  33.3%  52.6%   
 
Combined  1  4  28  1  1  22  57 
  0.8%  3.3%  23.3%  0.8%  0.8%  18.3%  47.5% 
  25.0%  30.8%  47.5%  14.3%  16.7%  71.0%   
Top of each cell: Number of times coalitions formed. Middle of each cell: Percentage coalition formation by 





Under the  6 s   treatments, note that coalitions of any size formed in 102 of 120 (85%) 
trials. Eighty-two of these coalitions (80.4%) were efficient coalitions. Thus, coalitions formed 
quite frequently in the  6 s   treatments and the greatest majority of these were efficient. Overall, 
the efficient coalition formed in 82 out of 120 trials (68.3%). Other coalitions formed far less 
frequently. When groups implemented the 6-player membership requirement, the coalition 
formed 95.4 percent of the time. This suggests that the main reason that smaller than efficient 21 
 
coalitions formed in a minority of the trials is because groups sometimes failed to implement the 
6-player membership requirement.   
   In contrast, coalitions formed far less frequently under the  3 s   treatments and only 
about half of these were efficient. Coalitions formed in 47.5 percent of trials under these 
treatments, which is significantly lower than the 85.0 percent coalition formation rate under the 
6 s   treatments (p = 0.000). Of the 57 coalitions that formed only 28 of these were efficient. 
The rate at which efficient coalitions formed under the  3 s   treatments (23.3%) is far lower 
than the rate at which the efficient coalition formed under the  6 s   treatment (68.3%, p = 
0.000). One reason for the low rate of efficient coalition formation is the low rate at which the 3-
player membership requirement was implemented (49.2% of trials from Table 1). Recall that the 
6-player membership requirement was implemented in a significant number of trials. In fact, the 
grand coalition formed in 18.3 percent of all trials in the  3 s   treatments, while the efficient 
coalition formed in 23.3 percent of trials.  
  Another reason the efficient coalition failed to form in the  3 s   treatments is that it 
formed only 47.5 percent of the time when the 3-player membership requirement was adopted. 
Let us explore this phenomenon more closely, since it implies that some individuals willfully 
blocked efficient coalitions. Recall that an individual blocks a coalition if her willingness to join 
is critical for its formation, but she refuses to join so the coalition does not form. The 3-player 
membership requirement was implemented in 59 out of 120 trials (49.2% from Table 1) in the 
combined homogenous and heterogeneous payoff treatments under  3 s  .  The efficient 
coalition failed to form in 31 of these trials. Of these 31 failures, 29 were blocked by individuals 
who voted for a membership requirement of three or more players. Of these 29, 11 were due to 
blocks by individuals who voted for membership requirements with more than three players, 
while 18 were due to blocks by individuals who actually voted to implement the 3-player 
membership requirement.  All of these blocks would be inconsistent with a coalition formation 
model with only individuals with standard preferences: these individuals would never block an 
efficient coalition because they find them profitable. These blocks are, however, consistent with 
the presence of inequality-averse subjects. It is easy to understand why an inequality-averse 
subject whose minimum profitable coalition is larger than the efficient coalition would vote for a 
higher membership requirement and also refuse to join an efficient coalition. It is more 
surprising that some individuals who voted for the 3-player membership requirement blocked 22 
 
this coalition from forming. However, we showed in section 2 why this could occur.  Such an 
individual envisions little chance that a coalition they find profitable would form; they are better 
off if the efficient coalition forms than if no coalition forms so they vote to implement this 
membership requirement, but they are better off if no coalition forms than joining the efficient 
coalition so they refuse to join if given the opportunity.  We find it interesting that this behavior 
plays a significant role in preventing efficient coalitions from forming.  
  We complete our data analysis with results on average public good provision and average 
efficiency in Table 3.  Efficiency for each group in each period is calculated as the ratio of 
aggregate payoffs to maximum payoffs. As expected, public good provision was lower in the  
3 s   treatments than in the   6 s   treatments. More importantly, the inability of subjects under 
the  3 s  treatments to form efficient coalitions consistently produced significantly lower 
efficiency as compared to the  6 s   treatments. For the homogenous and heterogeneous payoff 
treatments combined, subjects earned 87.5 percent of maximum earnings under the  6 s   
treatments, while subjects earned significantly less, 68.7 percent, under the  3 s   treatments (p = 
0.000).  On average, public good provision and efficiency were less under the heterogeneous 
treatment than under the homogenous treatments, but these differences are not significant (for 
public good provision,  p = 0.213 and p= 0.585; for efficiency, p = 0.194 and p = 0.428 for 6 s   
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Standard errors are in parentheses. Each treatment consists of 60 group-level observations. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
We have analyzed, both theoretically and experimentally, endogenous coalition formation in 
which players determine a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether they will 
join the coalition. We demonstrate theoretically that if all players only care about maximizing 
their expected financial payoffs, they will vote to implement an efficient coalition size as the 
membership requirement and this coalition will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some 
players are averse to inequality they can move groups to inefficient outcomes, particularly if an 
efficient coalition is smaller than the grand coalition. Inequality-averse individuals can cause 
larger-than-efficient coalitions to form, and they may block the formation of efficient coalitions.  
  In general our experimental results are consistent with a model of coalition formation in 
which players have an aversion to inequality. In treatments for which the efficient coalition was 
the grand coalition, coalitions formed 85 percent of the time and most of these were efficient. 
While this result is predicted by a model of players having standard preferences, adopting the 
grand coalition is also consistent with inequality aversion since this coalition size minimizes 
inequality.  On the other hand, in treatments for which the efficient coalition required only a 24 
 
subset of the group, coalitions formed in just over half the trials, but only half of these were 
efficient. In fact, the grand coalition formed at about the same rate as the efficient coalition. We 
also find that efficient coalitions that allowed for free riding were blocked about half the time. 
Although individuals with standard payoff-maximizing preferences would never adopt larger-
than-efficient coalitions or block efficient coalitions from forming, these actions are consistent 
with inequality-averse individuals. 
Our results also demonstrate the value of the endogenous implementation of a minimum 
membership requirement in promoting coalition formation and public good provision when the 
efficient coalition is the grand coalition. When efficiency required full participation in our 
experiments, coalitions were 87.5 percent efficient on average. This efficiency level is high 
compared to other experiments on coalition formation with similar incentives as ours but without 
minimum membership requirements. For example, Kosfeld et al. (2009), Dannenberg et al. 
(2010) and McEvoy et al. (2010) report average efficiency measures of 60.5, 22 and 57.9 percent 
respectively. 
  The research also provides insight into the role preferences for equity play in the design 
of effective institutions that govern international public goods. One of the striking results from 
this study is the high frequency of trials in which groups adopted the grand coalition even though 
efficiency required some degree of free riding. This finding may help explain the choice of 
participation requirements in many existing voluntary institutions. Specifically, the fact that 
many international environmental agreements require full, or very high levels of participation 
(Barrett 2003). In light of our results it is possible that some of these existing agreements have 
participation thresholds that are inefficiently high in order to limit the extent of free-rider 
payoffs. 
Many economists now appreciate the role that equity and fairness play in the design of 
effective institutions to resolve social dilemma situations. The typical result in the literature is 
that inequality aversion can help foster cooperation between group members in public goods and 
common-pool resource games and lead to more-efficient outcomes. Our study contributes to this 
growing theoretical and experimental literature on inequality. With the endogenous institution 
we consider, we show that inequality aversion can actually move groups away from efficient 
outcomes. The complete picture shows that inequality aversion can either foster or frustrate 25 
 
cooperation among group members, and which prevails likely depends on whether resolving the 
social dilemma mitigates or exacerbates inequality measures.  
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